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As the United States and other industrialized countries have promul-
gated standards of safety and health for the workplace since the 1970s,
employers have sought methods of minimizing or avoiding the cost of
such controls. One method is simply to relocate hazardous production
processes in developing nations that do not demand compliance with oc-
cupational health standards. This has resulted in the export of occupa-
tionally-related diseases to developing countries. The problem warrants
the concern of human rights and public health advocates in the United
States and other countries from which hazardous industries are exported.
This Article focuses on one well-documented occupational hazard, as-
bestos, and examines the role of United States companies in exporting
hazardous asbestos operations. It then reviews several mechanisms that
could be used to prevent the establishment of "dirty workplaces" abroad,
including both international and national regulation as well as legal ac-
tion. The Article concludes that neither international nor United States
regulation offers effective and timely control of the problem. The Article
proposes a third mechanism-one previously uninvestigated-whereby
workers diseased through exposure to asbestos in operations owned or
run by American companies abroad could bring suit, using tort litigation
based on strict products liability, in United States courts.
The American common law basis for this tort litigation is well settled;
thousands of suits have been filed since the initial products liability case,
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.2 This litigation has resulted in
tighter and more timely workplace controls than those stipulated by oc-
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1. There have been a number of articles written about the export of hazardous consumer
products. See Comment, Export of Pharmaceutical Products Under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125 (1980); Comment, U.S. Export of Products
Banned for Domestic Use, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331 (1979); Comment, FederalAgency Respon-
sibility to Assess Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 425 (1979).
2. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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cupational safety and health laws. The major unresolved question differ-
entiating the type of remedy proposed in this Article, however, is that of
foreign workers' access to United States courts. The recent United States
Supreme Court decision, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,3 which sets forth
criteria for foreign plaintiffs seeking access to United States courts, is
examined. The Article then illustrates this approach by reference to two
case studies of asbestos plants owned or operated by American compa-
nies abroad.4
I. Export of Hazardous Industries
Occupational disease has been an unacknowledged epidemic in devel-
oped countries. Only during the past twenty years have there been effec-
tive demands for a clean-up of the workplace. The United States
Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act),5
which, among other things, sought to control occupational cancer by set-
ting standards for carcinogens commonly found in the workplace. 6 Op-
ponents have contended that such controls impose undue expense,7 and
they successfully have challenged certain standards in court.8 However,
the efforts of labor unions and health activists have resulted in the pro-
mulgation of some fairly strict standards.9
One industry response to such controls has been to move hazardous
3. 454 U.S. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
4. The case studies offer varied examples of conditions in foreign workplaces, details of
United States firms' relationships to the local operations, and the host country's labor, tort,
and workers' compensation laws. These examples will illustrate the Article's analysis of how
foreign plaintiffs who have been exposed to disease in the workplace might gain access to
United States courts, although the Article does not mean to imply that the workers should
bring suit.
5. See generally SPANN, THE NEW OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: LAW
AND Pa.CTEn (1976); Cohen, The Occupational Safety and Health Act: A Labor Lawyer's
Overview, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1972); Nichols & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the
Workplace: An Assessment of OSHA, 31 PuB. INTEREsT 39 (1977). Specific references to
occupational concerns are found in the legislative history. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178.
6. By the end of 1974, final standards had been issued for asbestos, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001
(1981); vinyl chloride, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (1981); and 14 organic carcinogens, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1002-1990. In 1975-77, after the appointment of Dr. Eula Bingham, an occupational
health activist, as Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, the agency issued standards for
beryllium, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(0(8) (1981), and arsenic, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018 (1981).
7. See, e.g., petitioner's position in Society of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301,
1308 (2d Cir. 1975) (vinyl chloride standard approved).
8. See American Petroleum Inst. v. Industrial Union Dept., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). See also
Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances
Under the OSHA Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1979); Note, Cost Benefit Analysis Standard for
Regulation of Toxic Substances Under the OSHA Act: American Petroleum InsL v. OSHA, 60
B.U.L. REv. 115 (1980).
9. See standards for various compounds discussed supra note 6.
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industries overseas. Many Third World governments have less strict pol-
lution and workplace environment controls1 ° and have long welcomed
and encouraged industrialization by foreign capital.'1 Moreover, the at-
tenuated development of labor unions means that the demands of work-
ers are articulated poorly in many developing countries. 12
Long before this "flight of dirty industries" 13 phenomenon was uncov-
ered, there were sporadic reports from developing countries of diseases
caused by massive exposures to toxic substances in the workplace. 14 In
the past few years, several patterns have become clear. One is that the
production of dangerous chemicals moves overseas once regulation oc-
10. Indeed, one United Nations document lists this as one of the main competitive advan-
tages possessed by Third World countries. See U.N. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZA-
TION, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SURVEY 288-89 (1974). See also Elling, Industrialization
and Occupational Hazards in Underdeveloped Countries, 7 INT'L J. HEALTH SERv. 209, 218
(1977) (quoting Mexican business magazine advertisement about lack of pollution controls).
11. For a review of this phenomenon, see Elling, supra note 10, at 209-25.
12. Thus, a multinational corporation can move a particular hazardous workplace to a
developing country without worrying that safety measures will be demanded by the govern-
ment or organized labor. See L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD
WORLD 190-205 (1973). ('The incentives for pioneer industries in countries like Singapore
and Malaysia specifically guarantee freedom from union trouble for a given number of years
.... It is not surprising that Third World union movements are weak. High levels of unem-
ployment do not help, and the average government is hostile, seeing the unions as annoying
pressure groups for real wages and more advanced services than the economy can afford..
Id. at 193.)
Even where unions exist, the characteristics of a Third World economy often put health
protection rates low on the government's list of priorities. See Vilanilam, A Historical and
Socioeconomic Analysis of Occupational Safety and Health in India, 10 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV.
233, 243 (1980).
13. In a 1978 article, researcher Barry Castleman briefly surveyed the relocation of haz-
ardous asbestos, arsenic, copper, and other industries overseas, and concluded that "[ifn the
next decade, the export of industrial hazards from the United States to the Third World is
likely to increase." Castleman, How We Export Dangerous Industries, 27 Bus. & Soc. REV. 7
(1978). Two years later, a pair of researchers scrutinized Castleman's assertion. Levenstein &
Eller, Are Hazardous Industries Fleeing Abroad?., 34 Bus. & Soc. REv. 44 (1980). Analyzing
data on United States direct investment abroad between 1966 and 1976, they concluded that
"the 'wholesale exodus of major industries' from the U.S. is an unlikely result of current at-
tempts to regulate occupational health and safety." Id. at 46. However, they based their con-
clusion on a superficial analysis of United States foreign investment data only through 1976,
which cannot fully support their conclusion. Moreover, the claim that there is not a wholesale
flight of dirty industries from the United States is based on the assertion that OSHA has not
been effective in administering and enforcing cleanup of the workplace in many industries, id.
at 45; thus, any increased effectiveness at OSHA in the future might be expected to set off
further flight of dirty industries.
14. See Femi-Pearse, Respiratory Symptoms and Their Relationship to Cigarette Smoking,
Dust, Occupational and Domestic Air Pollution: Studies in a Random Sample of an Urban
African Population, 22 W. AFR. MED. J. 57 (1973); Ghorbi, Report on the Current Status of
Radiation Protection in Tunisia: Future Prospects, 49 TUNIS MED. 295 (1971); Osmon, Health
Problems Resulting From Prolonged Exposure to Chemical Agents in the Rubber Industry, 47 J.
EGYPTIAN PUB. HEALTH A. 290 (1972); EI-Sadik, Exposure to Sulfuric Acid in Manufacture
of Storage Batteries, 14 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 322 (1972). This Article will not consider the
toxic exposure encountered by farmers in their fields from pesticides and fertilizers.
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curs in the United States, thus avoiding the capital expenditure for con-
trols required in the United States.1 5 Another, perhaps more
characteristic, pattern is the rather hasty shift to plants in Third World
countries when the hazardous nature of a work process is demonstrated
but before environmental controls are erected in the developed countries.
A classic example of the latter pattern concerns benzidine dyes. The
carcinogenicity of these dyes was established firmly in the late 1960s.16
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is
charged with administering the Act, finally issued an emergency stan-
dard in 1973.17 In the interim, however, the major domestic manufactur-
ers, GAF and Allied Chemical, had reduced drastically their production;
by 1977 they had closed their United States plants.1 8 The result was that
in 1980, "470,000 pounds of benzidine-based dyes were imported into the
United States, a 20-fold increase since 1976."19
The best example of the flight of dirty industries is the manufacture of
asbestos products. The dangers associated with exposure to asbestos fi-
bers have been recognized for over seventy-five years, and conclusive
proof of the health hazards of asbestos was published in 1964.20 Controls
on this carcinogen were tightened in almost every developed country in
the mid-1970s. 21
Since the advent of controls in the developed countries, there have
been various reports of asbestos manufacturing moving to Third World
15. In Nicaragua, a well-documented epidemic of mercury poisoning was associated with
inadequate pollution control by a factory owned and operated by the Pennwalt Corporation of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See Hassan, Mercury Poisoning in Nicaragua: A Case Study of the
Export of Environmental and Occupational Health Hazards by a Multinational Corporation, I 1
INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 221 (1981).
16. See Clayson, Benzidine and 2-Naphthylamine-Voluntary Substitution or Technologi-
cal Alternatives?, 271 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 170 (1976).
17. See S. Samuels, The International Context of Carcinogen Regulation: Benzidine, Ban-
bury Report 9: Quantification of Occupational Cancer 497, 501 (1981) (extensive documenta-
tion of the export of benzidine manufacturing).
18. Castleman, The Export of Hazardous Factories to Developing Nations, 9 INT'L J.
HEALTH SERv. 569, 591-92 (1979) [hereinafter Export of Hazardous Factories].
19. Ahmed & Scherr, Do Unto Others, AMicus J., Summer 1981, at 34, 38-39.
Much the same phenomenon may be occurring with regard to vinyl chloride, a carcinogen
first regulated by OSHA in 1975. See Export of Hazardous Factories, supra note 18, 593-94;
Vilanilam, supra note 12, at 242.
20. Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 J. AM. MED. A.
22 (1964); see also Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insula-
tion Workers in the United States, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SC. 139 (1965).
21. See, eg., Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972); Occu-
pational Exposure to Asbestos/Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 Fed. Reg. 47, 652 (1975).
See also Myers, The Social Context of Occupational Disease: Asbestos and South Africa, 11
INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 227, 241 (1981).
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nations.22 American asbestos manufacturers have been especially quick
to move the manufacturing process abroad, importing the finished prod-
ucts back into the United States. 23 This is reflected by statistics detailing
the huge increase in the import of asbestos textiles since 1970.24
Because many developing countries set industrial development as a na-
tional priority, controlling the spread of occupational hazards cannot be
achieved F 'mply by relying on developing countries to police themselves
and multinational corporations (MNCs).25 Moreover, many developing
countries lack both resources and industrial infrastructure, making less
advanced technologies more appropriate to their needs.26 Unfortunately,
the less advanced technologies in a particular industry are often the most
hazardous. The great appetite of many developing countries for eco-
nomic growth ensures that hazardous industrial technologies will con-
tinue to spread to developing countries, even when-as in the case of
asbestos-the health hazards are abundantly clear.27 In short, the inci-
dence of occupational diseases around the world is likely to increase in
the foreseeable future.
The debilitating effects of dirty industries do not fall on either corpo-
rate managers or officials of developing countries, but rather on the
workers employed in the plants. Most of the workers are unaware of
these health risks.28 Lack of ready employment alternatives may prevent
22. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 21, at 243 (details on the transfer of an entire asbestos
textile plant from Hamburg, West Germany to Cape Town, South Africa).
23. Castleman documents two examples of asbestos processors moving overseas: Johns-
Manville Corporation to Madras, India, and Amatex Corporation to Agua Prieta, Mexico.
Export of Hazardous Factories, supra note 18, at 573-76.
24. Id. at 573-75. As Castleman repo.rts,
[p]rior to [1970] over 99 percent of U.S. [asbestos] textile imports came from Canada,
Europe and Japan. Imports from these regulating countries stayed at around 3 million
pounds per year in the years 1970-76, while total imports from Mexico, Taiwan and Bra-
zil shot up to nearly 4.5 million pounds in 1976.
Id. at 573-74. Imports supplied 35% of United States asbestos product demand in 1976. Id. at
572.
25. See, e.g., the case studies of Mexico and India discussed infra notes 151-219 and ac-
companying text, which indicate that despite the nominal concern for workers' health embod-
ied in official statements and the existence of numerous controls over foreign investment, both
countries have permitted American companies using hazardous production techniques to es-
tablish asbestos processing operations within their boundaries.
For example, Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution contains strong language about social
welfare guarantees for all citizens. The reality of the situation is that less than 30% of the
population is covered by any social security plan. See G. Comejos, Law and Population in
Mexico, LAW AND POPULATION SERIES No. 23, 39-49, 53. See also ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, A STATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF MExIcO IN MATTERS AFFECTING
BUSINESS 143 (4th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as O.A.S. DOCUMENT].
26. See, e.g., National Academy of Sciences, APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES 5-36 (1977).
27. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
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even those aware of the dangers from quitting their jobs or insisting on
health precautions. In effect, workers in plants with known occupational
hazards are being forced to risk their future health, without being in-
formed of the hazards they are encountering or being equipped to take
precautions.
Human rights organizations, as well as public health advocates, in
both developed and developing countries, are among the many groups
that should be concerned with this problem. The argument is often made
that because of their less-developed economies and large needs for eco-
nomic growth and development, 29 developing countries should not be
held to the standards of the developed countries in areas such as wages
and working conditions.30 Where dirty industries in developing coun-
tries present gross workplace health hazards, however, standards of in-
ternational human rights clearly indicate that every worker deserves
some basic protection.31 If developing country governments are not ade-
quately protecting their workers, the responsibility for educating and de-
fending the workers falls to advocacy groups. As experiences in the
United States and other developed countries have shown, controlling oc-
cupational hazards in developing countries may require concerted educa-
tional, political, and legal action by advocacy groups in developed
countries.
There are three potential mechanisms of control-international regu-
lation, United States regulation, and legal action-which advocacy
groups in the United States may explore as means of controlling the ex-
29. A Presidential interagency committee addressing the question of controlling exported
hazardous goods has observed:
Nations differ substantially in their economic and cultural conditions and in their use of,
and need for, hazardous substances. It is difficult for one nation to make decisions on the
acceptability of risks for another nation. Such assessments require extensive information
regarding economic, political, and social conditions which U.S. regulatory agencies do not
have and cannot readily obtain.
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON HAZARDOUS SuBSTANcES EXPORT POLICY, BACK-
GROUND REPORT ON THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON FEDERAL POLICY REGARDING THE Ex-
PORT OF BANNED OR SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTED SUBSTANCES 23 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP].
30. For a summary of this and related arguments, see T. Biersteker, The Social and Cul-
tural Impacts of Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries: The Case for the
Transnational Corporation 21-37 (May, 1981) (unpublished technical paper prepared for the
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations) (on file with the Yale Journal of World
Public Order).
3 1. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the General As-
sembly in 1948, establishes the right of every individual to life and to an adequate standard of
health. More recent declarations support this right. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 51, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) (providing for the human right to the highest
attainable standard of physical health); G.A. Res. 160, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 190,
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) (reaffirming the right to health and proper nourishment).
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port of hazardous production processes to developing countries by
American companies. This article focuses particularly on asbestos, but
the argument may hold for a number of other occupational hazards.
II. International Regulation of Hazardous Industries
Because the problem of occupational hazards has become an interna-
tional one, efforts to regulate or control the problem most logically
should be directed, or at least coordinated, at the international level.
With the exception of the International Labour Organisation (ILO),
international organizations have shown little awareness of occupational
hazards. Such international fora as the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs and the World Bank, which deal with matters of international
trade and investment, have ignored completely the flight of dirty indus-
tries to developing countries.
A. The United Nations General Assembly and Specialized Agencies
To date, the UN General Assembly has not dealt specifically with the
international spread of occupational diseases and hazards, nor has it at-
tempted to promulgate standards on occupational safety and health. It
has devoted some attention to international trade in, and use of, hazard-
ous products, particularly pharmaceuticals; similar actions could be
taken with regard to occupational safety and health.
The General Assembly first expressed concern about the harmful ef-
fects of toxic and hazardous products in 1979. Resolution 34/173 urged
member states to exchange information on such substances and "to dis-
courage. . . the exportation of. such products to other countries."' 32 In
the following year, the General Assembly established an information net-
work through the United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations
(U.N.C.T.C.) to exchange information on banned hazardous chemicals
and unsafe pharmaceutical products.33 While U.N.C.T.C. has begun to
incorporate data on banned hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceu-
tical products within its information system,34 it does not address work-
place hazards or the relocation of dirty industries. 35
Other international agencies, such as the World Health Organization,
32. G.A.Res. 173, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 189, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1979).
33. G.A. Res. 186, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 202, U.N. Doe. A/35/48 (1980).
34. United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations, Role of the Information Sys-
tem of Transnational Corporations Regarding the Exchange of Information on Banned Haz-
ardous Chemicals and Unsafe Pharmaceuticals, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/90 (1981) (on file with the
Yale Journal of World Public Order).
35. Confidential interview with U.N.C.T.C. staff member (May, 1982).
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the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the
United Nations Environment Programme, have been concerned with the
international spread of various consumer or environmental hazards.
However, their efforts have been aimed primarily at information dissemi-
nation rather than standard setting or regulation, and they have not di-
rected attention to specific occupational hazards. 36
B. The International Labour Organisation
The International Labour Organisation 37 is virtually the only interna-
tional body that has been concerned with industrial hazards such as as-
bestos. While the ILO has played a significant role in spreading
awareness of occupational hazards and in developing international stan-
dards, it apparently lacks the capability to enforce the cleanup of dirty
industries relocated in developing countries.
The ILO's principal purpose is to promulgate internationally accepted
standards on labor issues, including compensation, rights of organiza-
tion, and conditions of work. Official ILO standards, theoretically bind-
ing on the member states that endorse them, are embodied in ILO
Conventions.38 The ILO also issues non-binding Recommendations and
36. Among the relevant activities of other international organizations are the following:
(a) The World Health Organization has established a "Certification Scheme on the Quality
of Pharmaceutical Products Moving in International Commerce" to control trade in unsafe
drugs. It also established the International Programme on Chemical Safety in conjunction
with other U.N. bodies in 1980. See supra note 34, at 13.
(b) The United Nations Environment Programme has established a register of some 330
hazardous chemicals, as well as a volume providing information on the acute toxicity of 200
chemicals, the regulations and recommendations of various countries and international bodies,
and the trade and technical product names. Id. at 14-15.
(c) The Food and Agriculture Organisation has various programs to set standards and
spread information on the use of pesticides and food additives, some jointly with WHO. Id. at
17.
(d) Informational exchange programs also exist for members of such non-U.N. bodies as
the European Economic Community, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, and the International Organization of Consumers Unions. None of these bodies, to
the best of the authors' knowledge, has put into effect apparati to control occupational hazards
resulting from the international transfer of capital and technology. Id. at 16.
37. The ILO is an autonomous UN affiliate, of which some 146 countries are currently
members. Its origins date from 1919, when it was established as a forum for business, labor,
and government to discuss and formulate standards on labor issues.
38. ILO Conventions stipulate guidelines on specific labor issues; they must be ratified by a
two-thirds majority of the International Labour Conference (the ILO's policy-setting body),
and are binding on the member states ratifying them. Nations ratifying Conventions must
submit them "to their competent national authorities (i.e., the legislature)" for action, and
regularly report to the Secretariat on their progress in implementing Convention standards.
Conventions cannot be ratified subject to reservation; however, some Conventions can be
adopted in stages, and members may denounce past ratifications. See INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 1-9 (1976).
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other resolutions, which often have standard-setting importance in estab-
lishing references for national policies.39
Though the ILO has been active in disseminating information about
various occupational diseases and hazards since its inception,40 there cur-
rently is no official ILO standard regarding exposure to asbestos in the
workplace. Despite the lack of official standards, the ILO has been con-
cerned about the dangers posed by asbestos for several years, and it has
taken steps leading toward the adoption of a convention specifying stan-
dards of treatment for occupational exposure to asbestos. 41
39. Recommendations issued by the ILO Secretariat are not subject to ratification by
members and are not theoretically binding. Often Recommendations are issued simultane-
ously with Conventions, advising members on how to implement standards embodied in the
Conventions or suggesting stricter guidelines. Member states are expected to bring Recom-
mendations to the attention of the authorities '"within whose competence the matter lies'...
for the enactment of legislation or for other action," but do not have to report to the Secreta-
riat on their later status. Id at 1.
In addition, the ILO has devised numerous model codes, guides, and manuals to aid and
advise members in setting national standards. ILO conferences, country studies, information
exchanges, advisory team reports, and other information dissemination activities also convey
evaluations and possible standards on a wide range of labor issues. See INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR ORGANISATION, SERIES No. 44, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND GUIDING PRINCI-
PLES, 1944-1973 (1975).
40. The first Convention relating to occupational health and safety, addressing the hazards
of white lead in painting, was passed at the ILO's Third Session, in 1921. Since then a number
of Conventions and Recommendations have been adopted on such issues as safety in coalmines
and in dockwork, compensation for occupational accidents and disease, and medical care. See
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, CHART OF RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR CONVENTIONS (1982). See also the ILO's 1921 report on benzidine as a cause of
occupational cancer, cited in S. SAMUELS, NATIONAL STEWARDSHIP: UNILATERAL INTER-
NATIONAL REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIromENTAL HAZARDS 5 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL STEWARDSHIP].
41. The ILO report of a Meeting of Experts on the Safe Use of Asbestos, released in 1974,
recommends the adoption of "an international instrument or instruments on the safe use of
asbestos" and that, in the meantime, the ILO should circulate the report to members and
interested bodies and prepare a guide on the safe use of asbestos. The report reviewed a variety
of methods of preventing risks due to exposure to asbestos, including dust suppression, enclo-
sure and ventilation of working areas, personal protection (respiratory equipment and cloth-
ing), waste disposal, and storage of materials. The importance of measuring dust levels in the
work environment, regular medical supervision, and education and training of employers and
workers are also underlined. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, ASBESTOS: HEALTH
RISKS AND THEIR PREVENTION 7-18, 72-93 (1973).
Despite the present lack of specific standards, certain other standards could apply to asbes-
tos hazards in the workplace. ILO Convention 139 and Recommendation 147, both adopted
in 1974, call for the control of occupational carcinogens by law or "by any other method
consistent with national practice" and provide that member states ratifying the Convention
shall "periodically determine the carcinogenic substances and agents to which occupational
exposure shall be prohibited or made subject to authorization or control." ILO Convention
139, entered into force June 10, 1974. ILO Convention 148 and Recommendation 156, dated
1977, concern the control of air pollution, noise and vibration in the workplace.
An ILO model code of practice on occupational exposure to harmful airborne substances
also has been developed, and a report on occupational exposure limits for airborne toxic sub-
stances was published in 1977 to assist the exchange of information between governments on
worker exposure levels for airborne substances. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, OCCU-
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C. Assessment and Some Proposals
The ILO has been effective in developing standards on many impor-
tant issues relating to working conditions.42 Other international organi-
zations have not taken a similar interest or demonstrated a comparable
effectiveness. Several avenues are available to the ILO and other interna-
tional organizations in addressing this problem.
The UN General Assembly could express its concern by passing reso-
lutions condemning the internationalization of occupational hazards,
similar to those on the export of dangerous products. Once this concern
is registered, agencies such as the U.N.C.T.C. and the World Health Or-
ganization could begin incorporating data within their information net-
works on the movement of hazardous industries and its health effects.
More importantly, the ILO could formulate international standards for
asbestos and other occupational hazards as a basis for international con-
trols on the ffight of dirty industries from developed country regulation.
Even if these proposals were implemented, international regulation is
not sufficiently comprehensive or reliable. First, differences of interest
and opinion among member nations of international bodies, such as the
ILO, have delayed and will continue to delay the development of strict
standards for many occupational hazards.43 As long as a handful of pro-
ducing nations resist adoption of comprehensive standards on exposure
to occupational hazards, effective international regulation will not be
promulgated or implemented. 44
PATIONAL ExPosuRE LImrrs FOR AIRBORNE Toxic SUBSTANCEs (1977), which contains in-
formation from 18 governments on their standards.
Finally, the Occupational Safety and Health Information Center (C.I.S.) has been estab-
lished within the ILO to maintain a computerized data base of published materials on all
aspects of occupational safety and health. The ILO also has established the International Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Hazard Alert System to circulate rapidly information on severe
or newly discovered occupational hazards among member nations.
42. There is a large body of literature published by the ILO on the effectiveness of its
standards. In addition to ILO Standards and Recommendations, supra notes 38-39, see E.
LANDY, THE EFFEcTivENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: 30 YEARS OF ILO EXPER-
IENcES (1966); Landy, The Influence of International Labour Standards: Possibility and Per-
formance, 101, INT'L LAB. REV. 555 (1970); Parmeggiani, State of the Art: Recent Legislation
on Workers' Health and Safety, 121 IN'L LAB. REV. 271 (1982); Robert & Parmeggiani, Fifty
Years of International Collaboration in Occupational Safety and Health, 99 INT'L LAB. REV.
85 (1969). For an excellent bibliography on this topic, see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OROANI-
SATION, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
101-04 (1976).
43. See, e.g., the discussion on ILO Convention 139 (benzidine dyes) in S. SAMUELS, supra
note 40, at 39-42.
44. Keynes's description of the League of Nations Assembly-as "an unwieldy polyglot
debating society, in which the greatest resolution and the best management may fail altogether
to bring issues to a head against an opposition in favour of the status quo"--is fitting here. 3.
M. KEYNES, Proposals for the Reconstruction of Europe, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION.
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Second, the scope of international regulation is incomplete. For in-
stance, not all countries producing or manufacturing hazardous sub-
stances are represented in the ILO, the most prominent example being
South Africa. Moreover, countries which are members need not ratify
the standards adopted by the ILO or other agencies. 45
Finally, national implementation of international standards generally
has proven inadequate and unreliable. Even nations which ratify ILO
Conventions may not succeed in putting those standards into effect if
sufficient domestic opposition exists, and developing countries may lack
the bureaucracy or infrastructure to monitor and enforce standards. In-
ternational organizations simply lack the authority or capability to en-
force compliance with adopted standards or resolutions on recalcitrant
members.46
III. National Stewardship
A second proposal for controlling the flight of dirty industries to devel-
oping countries is national stewardship.47 This entails unilateral regula-
tion by the home country of the MNCs seeking to export hazardous
technologies. Coordinated national stewardship policies by the home
countries effectively could eliminate the flight of industries in response to
cleaner domestic workplace regulations in developed countries. The ac-
tion of even one major home country, such as the United States, could be
significant.
As in the case of international regulation, calls for national regulation
of exported hazards in the past have been concerned primarily with dan-
45. For example, only 16 nations have ratified ILO Convention No. 139 on occupational
cancer, even though it was adopted in 1974. Countries which have not ratified include such
major industrial powers as the United States, the U.S.S.R., France, and Germany; among the
many semi-industrialized countries failing to ratify are Mexico, India, the Philippines, and
Malaysia. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CHART OF RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR CONVENTIONS (1982).
Certainly, there are cases where nations not ratifying standards have nevertheless put them
or comparable standards into effect-the ILO cites United States implementing, but not ratify-
ing, Convention 32 on the prevention of accidents among dock workers. See Jenks, ILO Stan-
dards: Are They Obsolete, Premature, Marginal or Important, in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
OFFICE, SOCIAL POLICY IN CHANGING WORLD: THE ILO RESPONSE (1976).
46. For example, a leading scholar of the United Nations notes that a "major limiting
factor of the organized [peace] settlement system [of the UN] is the essential principle of vol-
untarism... ." C. INIS, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 228 (4th ed. 1971). Although he argues that the system
affords a number of important benefits such as third party mediation, the principle of volunta-
rism simply makes the enforcement of UN resolutions or actions against resisting states impos-
sible. Id. at 227-43.
47. For a clear definition of the national stewardship approach in the area of occupational
hazards, see NATIONAL STEWARDSHIP, supra note 40, at 5.
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gerous consumer goods and environmental hazards, rather than the ex-
port of hazardous production technologies.48 In early 1981, following
intensive study by an Interagency Working Group,49 President Carter
issued Executive Order No. 12264, which required extensive controls on
the export of extremely hazardous products.50 Although the Order
largely neglected the export of hazardous industries from the United
States, one provision did require that foreign governments be notified an-
nually of OSHA health standards for substances causing hazardous
workplace conditions.5 1 However, the Order was quite short-lived. Pres-
ident Reagan assumed office a few days after the Order was issued, and
quickly nullified it.52
Despite its brief life, Executive Order No. 12264 illustrates the na-
tional stewardship approach in its use of existing legislation on consumer
protection and occupational safety and health to impose strict controls
on exports of hazardous products. These and other areas of law, such as
United States antitrust and tax laws, might prove useful in controlling
the export of hazardous industries. A brief review of each of these areas,
however, indicates that none is sufficiently comprehensive to control ade-
quately the foreign investment and transfer abroad of hazardous technol-
ogy of United States corporations.
First, tax laws largely are neutral on the matter of overseas investment
by United States corporations. It is doubtful whether they could be ex-
tended to halt the transfer of hazardous technologies abroad.5 3 Second,
although antitrust laws give the United States government legislative au-
thority to deal with the effect of outward foreign investment on the
United States economy,54 they are unlikely to be effective in cases where
individual companies relocate to avoid workplace controls, because of
the slight effect of such relocations on the economy. 55
The Occupational Safety and Health Act and consumer product regu-
48. See Export of Hazardous Product" Hearings before the Subcomm. on International
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
49. The Carter Administration expressed concern about the export of hazardous products
which are banned in the United States, including chemically-treated infant wear and danger-
ous pharmaceuticals. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP, supra note 29.
50. Exec. Order No. 12264, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1982).
51. Id.
52. The Carter order was issued on January 15, 1981, and was in effect only 32 days. On
February 17, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12290, which cancelled the previ-
ous order. See 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
53. This is the conclusion reached by three prominent analysts of the relationships between
United States policy and United States multinational corporations. See C.F. BERGSTEN, T.
HORST & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS 451 (1978).
54. Id. at 255-57.
55. A three-pronged test was established in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of North
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lations are potentially more useful because they include provisions to
control trade in hazardous products,56 but they do not cover foreign in-
vestment or the sale of technology abroad by United States firms. Their
potential value as instruments in cleaning up hazardous workplaces in
other countries is equivocal at best and probably easily circumvented by
the companies.
Perhaps the most relevant existing statute is the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979 (EAA),57 which authorizes the President to "prohibit or
curtail the exportation of any goods, technology, or other information
. ..to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of
the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations. 58
Although the EAA would allow the President to control the export of
hazardous substances,59 the legality of its application to exported hazard-
ous technologies is doubtful.6°
In addition to the legal uncertainties, there are theoretical and political
obstacles to using the Export Administration Act. First, use of the EAA
would require an administration committed to developing such controls
in the face of strong opposition from United States companies. Second,
there is an inherent problem in controlling the diffusion of technology;
because "technology" is in fact embodied in goods, manpower, methods
of industrial organization, and management, as well as in machinery and
direct foreign investment, it cannot easily be regulated or controlled by
America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), to determine whether a United States
court should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases. The three factors are:
(1) whether the alleged restraint of trade affected, or was intended to affect, the foreign
commerce of the United States;
(2) whether the restraint was of a type that would be cognizable as a Sherman Act
violation;
(3) and whether extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. should be asserted, in light of
considerations of international comity and fairness.
Id. at 615. Regarding the last factor, United States courts generally have been unwilling to
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction where compulsion of foreign sovereigns is entailed. See
40 A.L.R. Fed. 343, 356-58 (1978). But see infra note 154.
56. If, for instance, a company is supplying hazardous asbestos products abroad or is im-
porting such goods as intermediate inputs to further industrial production in the United States,
these laws could be invoked to restrict the export or import of such goods.
57. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, 50 U.S.C. App.
§§ 2401-2420.
58. Id. see. 6(a)(1).
59. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP, supra note 29, at 32.
60. This is the conclusion reached by the Interagency Working Group, which stated that:
[while] in the case of banned or severely restricted hazardous substances, there are ample
precedents for export controls . . . . this is not true for export of production facili-
ties. . . .Any system of controls for export of hazardous facilities would require a statu-
tory basis... [which] is an issue that the Congress would want to examine.
Id. at 55-56.
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simply erecting trade or investment barriers. 61 Developing effective con-
trols over all these areas-particularly attempting to control the foreign
direct investment by United States companies-would run counter to
past United States policies and attitudes, and likely would be opposed
within the government bureaucracy.62
In sum, existing statutes probably are insufficient to control the export
of hazardous asbestos technology by United States companies. Develop-
ment of new effective statutes would require congressional action. How-
ever, congressional efforts to develop such statutes undoubtedly would
arouse strong political opposition and would require a more hospitable
political environment than currently exists. The constellation of political
forces that would oppose such a measure are formidable-major corpo-
rations and their lobbyists, as well as free trade advocates in academia
and the government-while the forces supporting the measure would, by
and large, likely be limited to a few concerned advocacy and labor
groups.63 Although the national stewardship option is desirable and
should be pursued, it depends too heavily on political action to be a relia-
ble method of control.
IV. Tort Litigation in the United States by Foreign Plaintiffs
Inadequate international regulation and national stewardship leads to
the consideration of a third option, tort litigation brought in United
States courts by workers exposed to asbestos hazards in foreign work-
places owned, run, or supplied by American corporations. Successful
court action by foreign plaintiffs in American courts could provide an
incentive for corporations attempting to evade United States workplace
regulations to take more extensive health precautions in their asbestos
61. See, e.g., F. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ISSUES AND POL-
ICY OPTIONS, WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPER #344 (1979); TECHNOLOGY AND IN-
TERNATiONAL AFFAIRS (J. Szyliowicz ed. 1981).
62. C. BERGSTEN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, supra note 53, ch. 9; S. COHEN, THE MAKING
OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 3-25 (1977).
Many analysts, critical as well as supportive of the role of American MNCs in the world
economy, see the companies as a powerful tool for the expansion and preservation of United
States power and influence abroad. For different views on this issue, see R. BARNET & R.
MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1976);
R. GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, chs. 2, 5-7 (1975).
For a defense of the role of MNCs in the development and transfer of technology to develop-
ing countries, see R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL ISSUES, ch.
3 (1977); Ranis, The Multinational Corporations as an Instrument of Development, in THE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (D. Apter & L. Goodman eds. 1976).
63. The AFL-CIO is the most prominent in this regard and has proposed legislative action
to extend existing statutes to allow greater control over relocation of hazardous industries. See
NATIONAL STEWARDSHIP, supra note 40, at 66-68.
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operations abroad. Even if this negative incentive to control the flight of
dirty asbestos industries would not reduce significantly occupational
hazards in MNC operations abroad, foreign asbestos workers contracting
diseases as a result of negligent workplace practices by United States
firms nevertheless may obtain some recompense for their illnesses
through the courts."
A. History of Asbestos Litigation in the United States Courts
Workers in developing countries who bring suit against asbestos cor-
porations in the United States will benefit greatly from the extensive tort
litigation that has been brought on behalf of American asbestos workers.
Successful actions by American workers have included several key com-
ponents: 1) establishing the ill-health effects of occupational exposure to
asbestos; 2) bringing suit against suppliers of asbestos under products
liability law; and 3) the use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to pre-
vent costly and time consuming delays in the conduct of the asbestos
litigation.
1. Ill-Health Effects of Occupational Exposure to Asbestos:
Discovery and Verification
The special properties of asbestos, including its great tensile strength
and thermal insulative value, have resulted in widespread industrial and
consumer use.65 As evidence of the dangers of asbestos began to accu-
mulate early in this century, however, health workers began to realize
that asbestos was not harmless.66 By 1918, a life insurance company
refused to insure asbestos workers due to their increased rates of pulmo-
64. This Article's discussion is limited to the legal basis of such a suit. It does not attempt
to resolve some of the practical obstacles that foreign workers or their advocates might face in
the course of bringing suit. For example, in the face of likely opposition from foreign govern-
ments as well as the asbestos companies, human rights groups in the United States interested
in pursuing this legal strategy probably would have to locate diseased workers in developing
countries and gather evidence on such issues as plant conditions and how the plaintiff was
exposed to asbestos. Similar obstacles have not stopped human rights groups in the past from
locating and defending individuals in developing countries whose human rights have been vio-
lated by multinational firms or their own governments. One of the best known examples is
Amnesty International. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL RE-
PORT 1981 at 1-22.
65. For example, asbestos has been used in water pipes, wallboards, protective cloth, and
brake and clutch linings. See Spell & Leineweber, Asbestos Minerals in Modern Technology, 2
ENVTL. RES. 166 (1969).
66. Anderson, Historical Sketch of the Development of Legislation for Injurious and Dan-
gerous Industries in England, in DANGEROUS TRADES (T. Oliver ed. 1902); Lanza et. al.,
Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers, 50 PuB. HEALTH
REP. 1 (1935); McPheeters, A Survey of a Group of Employees Exposed to Asbestos Dust, 18 J.
INDUS. HYGIENE & TOXICOLOGY 229 (1936); Shull, Asbestosis: A Roentgenologic Review of 71
Cases, 27 RADIOLOGY, 279 (1936).
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nary disease. 67 In the next forty years, evidence linked exposure to asbes-
tos with various cancers and lung disease,68 and conclusive
documentation of the ill-health effects of asbestos was published in
1964.69 The asbestos industry was aware of these reports and actively
tried to suppress them.70
67. F.L. HOFFMAN, MORTALITY FROM RESPIRATORY DISEASES IN DUSTY TRADES (IN-
ORGANIC DusTs) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Industrial Accidents & Hygiene Series No. 17, 1918).
68. Bonser, Occupational Cancer of the Urinary Bladder in Dyestuffs Operatives and of the
Lung in Asbestos Textile Workers and Iron Ore Miners, 25 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 126
(1955); Egbert & Geiger, Pulmonary Asbestosis and Carcinoma-Report of a Case with Nec-
ropsy Findings, 34 AM. REv. TUBERCULOSIS 143 (1936); Gloyne, Two Cases of Squamous
Carcinoma of the Lung Occurring in Asbestosis, 17 TUVERCLE 5 (1935); Lynch & Smith, Pul-
monary Asbestosis Il Carcinoma of the Lung in Asbesto-silicosis, 24 AM. J. CANCER 56
(1935).
69. See Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, supra note 20.
Among the ill-health effects of asbestos is asbestosis, a chronic inflammation of the lung that
eventually results in fibrosis of the lung, respiratory failure, and death. The severity of the
disease is related to intensity and duration of exposure to asbestos fibers. Asbestos also can
cause bronchogenic carcinoma, a lung cancer, and mesothelioma, a very rare malignant tumor
on organ surfaces. Both types of malignancies can be caused by very short or insignificant
exposures to asbestos, although there is usually a long interim or latency period of 20-30 years
before a worker contracts a malignancy as a result of an asbestos exposure. See A. HAMILTON
& A. HARDY, INDUSTRIAL TOXICOLOGY (4th ed. 1970); K. ISSELBACHER, HARRISON'S PRIN-
CIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (9th ed. 1980).
Controversy continues over the asbestosis "no effect" level. OSHA maintains a standard of
2 x 10.6 fibers/cubic meter, while NIOSH recommends 2 x 10.5 fibers/cubic meter. A no effect
level is the exposure level below which there is no risk of disease. Carcinogen dose/cancer
response curves are notoriously difficult to calculate. See S. EPSTEIN, POLITICS OF CANCER
83-89 (rev. ed. 1979). See also Harries, Experience with Asbestos Disease and its Control in
Great Britain's Naval Stockyard, 11 ENVTL. RES. 261 (1976); Jellinek, On the Inevitability of
Being Wrong, 363 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 43 (1981); Mantel & Schneidermann, Estimating
Safe Levels, A Hazardous Undertaking, 35 CANCER RESEARCH 1379 (1975); Schneiderman,
Regulation of Carcinogens in an Imprecise World, 363 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 217 (1981).
70. Epstein describes how industry communications were obtained through pre-trial dis-
covery proceedings in a South Carolina products liability case. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at
89-96.
Epstein quotes Judge Price, who reviewed the correspondence, as stating that it "shows a
pattern of denial and disease and attempts at suppression of information," and that it "further
reflects a conscious effort by the industry in the 1930s to downplay, or arguably suppress, the
dissemination of information to employees and the public for fear of promotion of lawsuits."
Id. at 90.
In light of growing concern about the ill-health effects of asbestos, one of the first actions
taken by the newly created OSHA was to promulgate an emergency standard. See id. at 83-89.
Industry protested that the standard was too stringent and warned that it would cause further
decline in an already depressed industry. See Export of Hazardous Factories, supra note 18, at
572.
Labor, on the other hand, complained that the emergency standard did not provide ade-
quate protection. Both sides challenged the standard in court. The D.C. Court of Appeals
upheld the standard, suggesting a new age of tough controls for workplace hazards. Industrial
Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court also noted that when
workers' health was endangered courts would uphold standards based upon information on
the "frontiers of science." Id. at 474.
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2. Asbestos Litigation under Products Liability Law
In the United States, asbestos workers who were not warned by asbes-
tos manufacturers about these dangers have sued asbestos suppliers for
damages under products liability laws. The reason is simple. A recovery
under workers' compensation law precludes workers from suing their
employers in tort. However, products liability law provides the workers
with an alternative remedy by suing the asbestos suppliers for marketing
a hazardous product without proper warnings. 71
The addition of Section 402A to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
produced tremendous changes in products liability law.72 Under this
section, a plaintiff need not prove the existence of a manufacturer's war-
ranty or negligence. As a result, the plaintiff's burden of proof is rela-
tively simple. Dean Prosser has noted that the plaintiff must establish
three things: "The first is that he has been injured by the product ....
The second is that the injury occurred because the product was defective,
unreasonably unsafe. . .The third is that the defect existed when the
product left the hands of the particular defendant. '73 Thus it would
seem that a plaintiff injured by asbestos must prove only that she was
diseased, that her disease was caused by asbestos, and that secondary
processing did not change the nature of the asbestos product.
Nevertheless, some problems remain. First, many difficulties arise in
attempting to prove that a product is defective.74 Second, the plaintiff
71. See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 814 (1966); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement writers urged that under-
lying the availability of a direct remedy against a supplier-manufacturer is the policy that
"demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption
be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained. ... Id. § 402A comment c.
Aside from these policy considerations, there are practical reasons for a worker to sue the
supplier directly. Recoveries under workers' compensation schemes often are inadequate. See
M. FRANKLIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 776-83 (2d ed. 1979). Since employers usu-
ally are immune from tort actions under the provisions of the workers' compensation statute,
the worker will seek to buttress his recovery by suing a third party, in this case the supplier.
Id. Moreover, even were this immunity to suit not available to employers, the worker would
seek recovery from the supplier because in many instances the particular factory that em-
ployed the worker has gone out of business.
72. Cutting through the previous morass of contract and tort law, § 402A imposes strict
liability on anyone who:
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property .. .The rule . . . applies although (a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has
not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
73. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 671-72 (4th ed. 1971). As Prosser
points out, the plaintiff's burden is decreased because she need prove neither the manufac-
turer's negligence nor that the product carried a warranty. Id. at 672-73.
74. See Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 28 TENN. L. REv. 325
(1971); Note, Products Liability and the Problem of Proof, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1777 (1969).
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must show that the product caused her disease, and must exclude the
possibility of intervening or multiple causes. 75 Third, comment j of Sec-
tion 402A implies that the defect must have been foreseeable before the
manufacturer can be held liable.76 These points have been and continue
to be litigated intensely in products liability suits. While Section 402A
has eased somewhat the burden of proof for products liability plaintiffs,
many issues remain upon which evidence must be submitted.
In 1972, in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.7 7 the first re-
ported case allowing recovery for an asbestos-related disease under a
products liability rubric, Chief Judge Fischer of the Eastern District of
Texas entered judgment following a jury verdict that asbestos manufac-
turers had breached their duty to the plaintiff Borel by failing to warn
him about the dangers of asbestos. On appeal, 78 the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's findings that asbestos was unreasonably dan-
gerous, 79 that manufacturers of asbestos insulation were aware of the
dangers of asbestos in the 1930s and 1940s when the plaintiff was first
exposed,80 and that they had failed to give any warnings until 1964-65.8l
These findings supported the court's decision to apply the Texas law of
strict products liability, which follows Section 402A of the
Restatement.82
75. This is especially difficult in occupational and environmental disease cases, in which
causation usually is defined in terms of epidemiological correlations. In this context, defend-
ants can readily suggest intervening causes, since a well-defined causal chain of events is not
presented by plaintiffs. See H. HART & A. HONORE, CAusATION IN THE LAW (4th ed. 1976).
76. Comment j states:
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the
population are allergic, and the ingredient. . . is one which the consumer would reason-
ably not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he
has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A), comment j (1965).
Prosser notes that the initial products liability suits refused to find strict liability on the
grounds that the maker could not have been expected to foresee the effects. Later decisions
allowed recovery, as it became clear that the manufacturer knew of the defect. W. PROSSER,
supra note 73, at 661.
Related to this is the issue of the temporal definition of foreseeability-foreseeability can be
determined from the vantage point of the knowledge available at the time of the trial, or from
that of the "state of the art" at the time the tort occurred. See M. FRANKLIN, supra note 71, at
502.
77. 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
It should be noted that Borel, like most workers, was prohibited from suing his employer for
damages due to workers' compensation laws. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 3
(Vernon 1967).
78. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
79. Id. at 1091.
80. Id. at 1092-93.
81. Id. at 1106.
82. Id. at 1087, 1107.
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3. The Use of Collateral Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation
The Borel decision is an extremely significant precedent. Not only has
it spawned a large number of suits, but it also suggests the possibility of
controlling hazardous substances, such as occupational carcinogens,
through products liability actions.8 3 Yet the decision was not a panacea
for those with asbestos-related disease. Each plaintiff has to follow Bo-
rel's strategy of assembling a team of experts to debate the dangers of
asbestos with the industry's experts. Since experts are scarce and the
amount of evidence necessary to prove a case is great, 84 asbestos products
liability suits are both expensive and time-consuming.85 Industry's strat-
egy is to discourage litigation by exacerbating these factors.
At least partly in recognition of these circumstances, Chief Judge
Fischer recently ruled that the offensive use of collateral estoppel could
be applied to the Borel finding that asbestos products as manufactured,
marketed, sold, or distributed are defective and unreasonably danger-
ous. 86 Judge Fischer noted that the judicial efficiency aspects of collat-
eral estoppel warranted its use in the asbestos litigation, for seriously ill
83. The number of outstanding claims is now estimated to be 20,000. MacAvoy, You Too
Will Pay for Asbestosis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, § 3 at 3, col. 2.
Presumably, if workers can make defense of products liability suits sufficiently burdensome
on manufacturers, the manufacturers at some point will determine that it is more cost-effective
to produce a safer product than to risk the burden of litigation. This is not, of course, the
optimal solution, because it is based on after-the-fact controls; the high incidence of occupa-
tional disease that would occur before such a point is reached is undesirable. However, given
the failure of OSHA's Generic Cancer Policy, this may be the only practical option.
84. Samples of such materials are on file with the Yale Journal of World Public Order.
85. It is estimated that the average cost to the plaintiff for a $35,000 recovery is $25,000,
and the defendant is estimated to spend $35,000. See KAKALIK, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGA-
TION (1983). In the last five years, approximately $660,000,000 has been spent to provide
$236,000,000 to plaintiffs in 3,800 cases. Id.
86. Mooney v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980). The
doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits re-litigation of issues involving identical factual situa-
tions which have been decided as a matter of law. For a comprehensive history of the develop-
ment of collateral estoppel, see Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The
Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL L. RV. 1003 (1979). See also Currie, Mutuality of
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1956); Semmel,
Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Note,
The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
Until recently, collateral estoppel could be applied only to re-litigation that involved the
original plaintiff and defendant. A number of decisions since 1972, however, have broadened
significantly the uses of the doctrine. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1972), the Supreme Court permitted the defensive use of collateral
estoppel, estopping the plaintiff from re-litigating the validity of a patent after a federal court
had ruled the patent invalid. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 324 (1979), the Court
for the first time allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel, estopping the defendants from
litigating issues that previously had been decided against them. However, Parklane did not
provide much guidance on several controversial issues arising out of the offensive use of collat-
eral estoppel, which have yet to be settled. See Currie, supra, at 285-86; Semmel, supra, at
1466-67.
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asbestos workers could not adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude with regard
to litigation.8 7
This decision has been followed and expanded by several courts,88 but
others have refused to grant collateral estoppel8 9 An appellate court
decision recently countenanced caution. In Hardy v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.,90 the Fifth Circuit overturned a district court's collateral es-
toppel order, thus confusing the rule of collateral estoppel in asbestos
litigation. Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that at least
certain aspects of asbestos workers' suits will be standardized so that de-
cisions will be made routinely and quickly. 91
B. The Access of Foreign Workers to United States Courts: The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
The above discussion illustrates some of the issues facing workers from
other countries in conducting asbestos litigation in United States courts.
Before they can argue these issues, however, they must gain access to
United States courts.
Plaintiffs in these actions should be able to establish that federal courts
have competence to hear their cases. Section 1332 of Title 28 of the
United States Code grants original jurisdiction to district courts where
the matter in controversy is greater than $10,000 and is between
"(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."92 So
long as plaintiffs meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of $10,000,
the district court will have subject matter jurisdiction.93
After establishing that the United States court has competence to hear
their claims, foreign plaintiffs then must overcome the doctrine of forum
non conveniens which the Supreme Court announced in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert94 and elaborated in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.95 This doctrine
87. Mooney v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242, 247 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
The judge reasoned that a seriously ill asbestos worker would not likely delay bringing his suit
until another worker had prevailed on the strict liability issue just so that he might take advan-
tage of the prior judgment and avoid the burden of proving that issue.
88. Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Hardy v,
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
89. Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329 (E.D. Mo. 1980); McCarty v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
90. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
91. See Brennan, Collateral Estoppel and the Asbestos Litigation, 14 ENVT'L L. 1 (1983).
See also Comment, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation: Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 15 CoNN. L. RPv. 247 (1983).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
93. See, eg., Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ohio
1982); Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
94. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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holds that even when it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and
venue is appropriate, a federal court can dismiss a suit if the plaintiff's
choice of forum is unreasonably inconvenient for the defendant or if trial
in the selected forum would administratively encumber the court. 96
Since Gilbert, legislative 97 and judicial98 developments have narrowed the
applicability of the doctrine. Nevertheless, it is still widely invoked to
deny foregn plaintiffs access to American forums.99 In Reyno, the
Supreme Court raised the original Gilbert obstacles still higher.
1. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert: Factors to be Considered
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert was a diversity suit brought in the Southern
District of New York for recovery based on damage to plaintiff's ware-
house in Virginia.l°° The district court dismissed the case on forum non
conveniens grounds,' 0 ' and the circuit court reversed.'0 2 In upholding
the district court, the Supreme Court attempted to enunciate a "bright-
line" standard. 0 3 First, the Court noted that the doctrine "presupposes
at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process."' 4
Next, the Court elaborated a list of public and private factors governing
access to federal courts. The private factors emphasized consideration of
convenience to the individual litigants,105 while the public factors focused
on the choice of law issue and the burden placed on the Court's docket
95. 454 U.S. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
96. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIIL PROCEDURE § 12.29 (2d ed. 1977); RE-
SrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 84 (1971); Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters ofAdmirality, 35 CORNELL. L.Q. 12 (1949);
Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908 (1947); Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1980);
Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Re.visited: A Decade of Development of the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in the Federal Courts, 17 J. INT'L L. 755
(1977).
97. Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code, passed by Congress in 1948, demands transfer
rather than dismissal of suits when one federal forum is more convenient than another. 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
98. Due process now protects defendants from having to litigate in distant or unreasonable
forums. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
99. See, e.g., Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978) (Iranian
citizen denied federal court for breach of contract action). The doctrine still is valid when the
alternative forum is a state rather than a federal court. See supra note 97.
100. 330 U.S. 501, 503 (1947).
101. 62 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
102. 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946).
103. 330 U.S. at 508. The Court allowed that it was impossible to catalogue any circum-
stances mandating dismissal.
104. Id. at 507.
105. The private factors include "the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises [if appropriate]; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive." Id. at 508.
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by cases wholly outside its territorial jurisdiction.10 6 The Court empha-
sized that "[t]he doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court...
unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."' 1 7 Since Gilbert, foreign
plaintiffs have been able to sue defendant corporations with continuous
business operations in the forum state if the district court decides, in its
discretion, that public and private favors weigh in the plaintiff's favor. 108
106. The public factors include:
the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the "local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home;" the interest in having the trial of a diversity case
in a forum that is at home with law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnec-
essary problems in conflicts of law, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness
of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981), citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. at 509.
107. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 508.
108. Plaintiffs' and defendants' citizenship was not mentioned as a factor in the forum non
conveniens determination. Indeed, before Reyno, foreign and domestic plaintiffs appear to
have had nearly equal chances of gaining a United States forum. See Note, The Convenient
Forum Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REV. 57, 67-74 (1967) (reviewing cases from 1947 to 1967); Note,
The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited: A Decade of Development of the Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens in International Litigation in the Federal Courts, supra note 96, at 778-79
(reviewing cases from 1967 to 1977).
Moreover, until recently federal courts consistently held that a defendant's burden was
much greater if dismissal forced an American plaintiff abroad to litigate. Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, supra note 96, at 379. However, the
Second Circuit's en banc holding in Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147 (2d
Cir. 1981), that "neither the admiralty nature of an action nor the American citizenship of a
plaintiff justifies creating a special rule of forum non conveniens," appears to indicate that the
foreign citizenship of a plaintiff is not to be a factor in weighing an American defendant's
forum non conveniens motion. Id. at 159.
Although not explicitly mentioned in Gilbert, several other plaintiff status issues have been
considered as factors. Most important is the plaintiff's financial ability to sue. For instance, in
Odita v. Elder Dempster Lines, 286 F. Supp. 547, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court noted that
"even if plaintiff were admitted to Great Britain, he would be financially unable to support
himself during the period prior to trial; and he would be unable to obtain adequate legal repre-
sentation there because the contingent fee is unlawful in Great Britain." See also Fiorenza v.
United States Steel Int'l, Ltd., 311 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussion of foreign plain-
tiff's inability to pay attorney's fee in home forum).
Another factor of some importance is that the courts are more willing to grant a forum non
conveniens motion when the majority of the litigation involves foreign co-defendants as well as
foreign plaintiffs. See, e.g., Mohr v. Allen, 407 F. Supp. 483, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Finally, forum selection clauses that are built into contract language will influence forum
non conveniens determinations, often precluding inquiry by a court. See Note, The Convenient
Forum Abroad Revisited: A Decade of Development of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in International Litigation in the Federal Courts, supra note 96, at 757-64. The force of such
clauses recently has been reiterated by the United States Supreme Court in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). This decision, however, has been minimized by
several subsequent district court opinions. See Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-
Boehler, 347 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (designated forum must be reasonable): Morse
Electro Prods. Corp. v. S.S. Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1977) (clause waived unless
raised immediately in response to request for supplemental briefs on the matter).
In addition, since the holding in Bremen is based on the assumption that a contract is the
product of "negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen," 407 U.S. at 12, it
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2. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno: Closing the Door
Against this background, the Supreme Court decided the case of Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 0 9 Reyno, the representative of the estates of Scot-
tish citizens killed in an air crash of a chartered plane in Scotland, had
sued Piper Aircraft, the manufacturer of the plane, and Hartzell Propel-
ler, Inc. (Hartzell), the manufacturer of the plane's propeller, in Califor-
nia to take advantage of that state's products liability laws.110 Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the case was transferred to the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, the site of Piper's manufacturing plant, where the defend-
ant's forum non conveniens motion was granted."'
Employing the Gilbert analysis, the district court found that both pub-
lic and private interests favored dismissal. While allowing that the criti-
cal evidence of design, manufacture, and testing of the plane and
propeller was located in the United States, the court determined that
most of the necessary evidence was located in Scotland." 2 The court also
noted that because the actions against the pilot and the charter company
had begun in Scotland, contribution actions following a decision in the
United States might lead to inconsistent verdict problems. 113 The court
concluded that the private interests favored litigation of all issues in
Scotland.
With regard to public interests, the district court concluded that Penn-
sylvania product liability law applied to Piper, and Scottish law to Hart-
zell.1 4 This meant that the court would have to apply Scottish law, with
would appear that it does not affect employment contracts. District courts have interpreted
the case in this matter. Compare Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Miss.
1979) (prohibiting effect of forum selection clause when one party to the contact is too weak to
bargain over the terms) with Dorizos v. j.emos and Pateras, Ltd. 437 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Ala.
1977) (holding that, in absence of facts suggesting unreasonability of enforcement, contract's
forum selection clause would be enforced) and Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp.
361 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (enforcing selection clause in employment contract, but noting that em-
ployee was financially capable of pursuing claims in German court).
109. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
110. Id. at 240.
111. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979). See also supra note
97.
112. Id. at 732.
113. Id. at 733. It is difficult to determine the weight the district court placed on this
factor, but it would certainly be mooted if actions had only been brought in the United States
court.
114. This determination followed complex procedural reasoning. Plaintiff Piper had
moved that the case be transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania from the Central
District of California. Under Van Dusen v. Barrack, 370 U.S. 612 (1964), the Pennsylvania
district court had to apply California choice of law rules. The district court then determined
that California's "governmental interest" analysis required that Pennsylvania liability law be
applied to Piper. 479 F. Supp. at 734.
The Hartzell choice of law question was even more complex. The California district court
determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Hartzell. However, it recognized that
Hartzell was amenable to service in Pennsylvania and transferred the case rather than dis-
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which it was unfamiliar, thus creating a burden on the court and citizens
of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, who had no real interest in this
apparently Scottish matter.1 15
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected each of the rationales relied upon
by the District Court.1 16 First, it determined that the private interests
were not in defendants' favor because the defendants failed to establish
that critical evidence would be unavailable or that inconsistent verdicts
were a major problem, for both Pennsylvania and Scotland could apply
principles of res judicata.'1 7 Second, public interests did not countenance
a forum non conveniens dismissal. Not only was application of Scottish
law not burdensome, it was also unnecessary. The Third Circuit's own
interpretation of Pennsylvania choice of law rules indicated that Penn-
sylvania, not Scottish, law should apply to Hartzell. 1 8 Third, the court
emphasized that "a dismissal for forum non conveniens, like a statutory
transfer, 'should not. . . result in a change in the applicable law.' "119
Because dismissal in favor of a Scottish forum would have resulted in the
loss of the strict products liability claim, the court ruled that a forum non
conveniens dismissal was inappropriate. 120
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in order to de-
cide whether the prospect of an unfavorable change in law was sufficient
to prohibit a forum non conveniens dismissal.121 Writing for the major-
missing it. Under Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), once service was
properly made in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania choice of law rules governed. The Pennsylvania
district court concluded that Scottish law should apply to Hartzell. 479 F. Supp. at 736-37.
115. 479 F. Supp. at 737. In a final portion of the decision that concerned neither explic-
itly public nor private interests, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that a forum non con-
veniens ruling was unfair as Scottish law was less favorable; any problems with foreign law
were "to be dealt with in the foreign forum." Id. at 738.
116. 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980).
117. Id. at 162.
118. Id. at 169-70. The Third Circuit's reasoning is persuasive. It noted that the district
court had relied solely on Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) in which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the old law of the state as the wrong analysis of
choice of law, replacing it with "a more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and
interests underlying the particular issue before the Court." Id. at 21, 203 A.2d at 805. Subse-
quent cases demonstrate that "where the place of the accident is fortuitous and the state where
the accident occurred has no interest in the regulatory standard at issue, any conflict between
that state and a state truly interested because, for example, the parties reside there. . . is a
false one." Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d at 170. The Third Circuit cited Cipolla v.
Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 565, 267 A.2d 854, 855 (1970); Kuchnic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 624,
222 A.2d 897, 899 (1967); and McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 94, 215 A.2d 677, 682
(1966), as support for its interpretation.
119. 630 F.2d at 164 (quoting DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978)). The court here relied on a comparison between forum non
conveniens and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), as elaborated by the Third Circuit in DeMateos. See also
supra note 97.
120. 630 F.2d at 165-71. The opinion indicates that these grounds alone were sufficient to
warrant reversal of the district court's dismissal.
121. 454 U.S. at 246 n.12. Justices Brennan and Stevens would have limited the Court's
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ity, Justice Marshall based the Court's reversal on two grounds. First, he
argued that the case of Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamship Co., 122
decided fifteen years before Gilbert, was dispositive in holding that a fo-
rum non conveniens determination should not consider the resulting
law.123 Justice Marshall then cited Gilbert for the proposition that forum
non conveniens determinations were to be flexible, emphasizing the dis-
cretion of the district court.124 Ifjudges were to grant or deny forum non
conveniens motions on grounds of the remedy granted by foreign juris-
dictions, forum non conveniens determinations would become a compli-
cated but mechanical process in which likely results in various
jurisdictions could be calculated.125 Moreover, American courts would
be flooded with litigation because American product liability laws are
more favorable than those of most other countries. 126
However, the Court did not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable
change in the law should never be a relevant consideration in a forum
non conveniens inquiry:
Of course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable
change in the law may be given substantial weight; the district court may
conclude that the dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.' 27
Justice Marshall explained in a footnote that there could not be a dis-
missal where the alternative remedy was clearly unsatisfactory, or where
the alternative forum did not permit litigation of the subject matter of the
dispute.128 Such was not the case here. Although a product liability
cause of action was unavailable to the plaintiffs, and the potential damage
review to the forum non conveniens/unfavorable law question upon which certiorari was
granted, returning all other determinations to the court of appeals. Id. at 261-62.
The majority prefaced its statement about forum non conveniens doctrine by noting, as the
Third Circuit did, that the Erie status of the doctrine is undecided. In this case, it was unnec-
essary to address that issue because Pennsylvania law is the same as federal forum non con-
veniens law. This question, which the court left open in Reyno, will be raised in future forum
non conveniens actions if state forum non conveniens law differs from the federal. Id. at 248
n.13.
122. 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
123. 454 U.S. at 247.
124. Id. at 249-50.
125. Id. at 251.
126. Id. at 252. Justice Marshall makes this point very strongly in a footnote, where, in
addition to the products liability law situation, he lists several other factors that make Ameri-
can courts especially favorable to plaintiffs: the multiple options presented by the 50 state
jurisdictions and choice of law rules; readily available jury trials; contingent attorney fees with-
out tax on losing parties; and more extensive discovery. Id. at 252 n.18.
127. Id. at 254.
128. Id. at 254 n.22. Justice Marshall cites Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78
F.R.D. 445 (D.C: Del. 1978), as clarification for this holding. Phoenix concerned tort and
unjust enrichment claims. The plaintiff argued that Ecuador, the alternative forum, possessed
no remedies for these claims.
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awards smaller, the plaintiffs nevertheless would be treated fairly in Scot-
tish courts. 129
After finding invalid the court of appeal's "unfavorable law/forum non
conveniens" ruling, the Supreme Court analyzed the district court's bal-
ancing of public and private interests. First, Marshall reiterated that a
foreign plaintiff's choice of forum was not to be given the automatic def-
erence due American plaintiffs. 130 Next, he allowed that there were suffi-
cient evidentiary difficulties to show that the district court had not
abused its discretion in ruling that the private interests favored dismis-
sal.13 ' Without ruling on the Pennsylvania choice of law issue, he also
found that public interest factors favored dismissal: Scotland's interest in
this case was great and "the incremental deterrence [ensuring American
companies manufacture safe products] that would be gained if this trial
were held in an America court [was] likely to be insignificant."' 132
3. Recent District Court Applications of Reyno
Several district court cases recently have interpreted Reyno. 133 Three
of these deserve special mention. The first of these is In Re Aircrash
Disaster Near Bombay 34 in which Judge Fitzgerald of the Western Dis-
trict of Washington denied the defendant aircraft manufacturer's forum
non conveniens motion in a suit on behalf of the deceased passengers and
crew. After accepting the plaintiffs' contention that Indian law time-
barred their suit, 35 Judge Fitzgerald focused on the alternative forum
language of Reyno.136 The determinative factor was that Indian law pre-
cluded Indian jurisdiction; therefore the court refused to consider private
and public interests, and denied the forum non conveniens motion.
129. 54 U.S. at 255.
130. Id. at 255 n.23. The dissent protested the legitimacy of this analysis. Id. at 261-62.
131. Id. at 257-58. He also noted that indemnity actions, if burdensome, could contribute
to a forum non conveniens dismissal. Id. at 259.
132. Id. at 260-61.
133. See, eg., Day & Zimmermann v. Exportadora Salcedo de Elaboradoros de Cacao,
S.A., 549 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (defendant does not meet burden of proof for forum
non conveniens dismissal set forth in Reyno); Gibbons v. Udaras Na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp.
1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (less favorable law not determinative for forum non conveniens motion);
Bland v U.S.S.R., 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,530 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (forum non conveniens mo-
tion denied where alternative forum deemed unsatisfactory).
134. 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
135. Judge Fitzgerald was forced to make an intensive analysis of Indian legal history
leading up to the Limitation Act of 1963. He concluded that the filing of the action in United
States court would not toll the Limitation Act, id. at 1180, and that defendant's offer to waive
a limitation defense would not be competent in Indian Court, id. at 1181. In addition, the lack
of assurances that Indian courts would promptly decide Indian legal issues prohibited a condi-
tional forum non conveniens dismissal such as had been orderd in Scherteinleif v. Traum, 589
F. 2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978). Id.
136. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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In Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,137 Judge Battisti of the Northern
District of Ohio was less confident that the "no alternative forum" point
was dispositive and chose to consider public and private interests as well.
The decision systematically analyzed the Reyno dicta concerning unsatis-
factory and nonexistent forums1 38 and concluded that the law of the al-
ternative forum should be considered at both the preliminary and the
balancing stages. 139 The court first noted that the law of Quebec, the
alternative forum for these Canadian plaintiffs suing defendant Ohio
drug company Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (RMI), would time-bar any
action. 140
Proceeding somewhat tentatively141 to public and private interests, the
court delineated why the case should not be dismissed. Plaintiffs' conten-
tions that much of the evidence regarding liability was at the Ohio manu-
facturing site, 142 and that most of the expert witnesses would be in the
Unites States,143 outweighed the availability of evidencewhich existed in
Quebec. 144 The court also held that the burden imposed by the possibil-
ity of conflicting verdicts was largely illusory because both forums fol-
lowed principles of res judicata. 145
As for public interests, the court ruled that Ohio choice of law rules
mandated that Ohio products liability law should apply.146 Ohio's gov-
ernmental interest in regulating RMI was given special weight because of
the degree of wrongful activity that had occurred in Ohio. 147 Finally, the
137. 538 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
138. Id. at 265-67.
139. The court reached this conclusion even though forum non conveniens doctrine was
"designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law." Id.
at 268 (quoting Reyno, 454 U.S. at 251).
140. Quebec law disallows a defendant's offer to waive its limitations defense. Lake v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. at 269.
141. Judge Battisti never appeared to be entirely sure whether it was necessary to proceed
beyond his original finding of an inadequate Quebec forum. He noted, for instance, that the
situation in this case was much more dispositive than that of the Phoenix case which the Reyno
Court cited as an example of an inadequate forum. Id. at 270 n.12.
142. Id. at 270.
143. Id.
144. The court noted that the defendant had failed to show the importance of the testi-
mony of those witnesses beyond compulsory process. Id. at 271. Thus the decision on private
interests is not dispositive with regard to what evidence is critical in a toxic substance products
liability suit.
145. Id.
146. Ohio uses a lex loci delicti rule modified by governmental interests to determine
choice of law. Id. at 273. Defendants argued that strict adherence to lex loci delecti required
application of Canadian law. The district court, however, cited more recent Ohio cases that
stress governmental interest and make a very good case for Ohio law. Id. at 273-74 (citing
Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 33-34 n.14 (3d Cir. 1975); Fox v. Morrison
Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 195-99, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971).
147. The court quoted extensively from plaintiffs' brief the compelling governmental inter-
ests that required application of Ohio law. These included the facts that:
the defendant (1) was headquartered in Ohio when it negotiated its license... ; (2) 'or-
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court stated that "the docket of this court will never be so overloaded as
to require the dismissal of cases legitimately brought before it.' ' 148 The
balancing stage produced a denial of the forum non conveniens motion.
The Lake decision was not the final word on forum non conveniens
determinations with regard to RMI's liability. In In Re Richardson-Mer-
rell, a decision published four months after Lake, Chief Judge Rubin of
the Southern District of Ohio took the opposite point of view on almost
every public and private interest factor and granted a forum non con-
veniens dismissal. 149 There is a critical difference between the cases: In
Re Richardson-Merrell concerned plaintiffs from the United Kingdom,
where a cause of action existed, at least in theory.150
The conflicting decisions of these two Ohio district courts provide two
significant footnotes to the Reyno decision. First, even after the Supreme
Court's apparently unambiguous decision in Reyno, district courts will
often reach different results after weighing public and private interests.
Second, a plaintiff would be well advised to argue to a district court judge
that a foreign forum is inadequate, or, for practical purposes, nonexistent
when trying to defeat a United States defendant's forum non conveniens
motion.
C. Case Studies: Mexico and India
The following case studies on asbestos plants in Mexico and India at-
tempt to illustrate how foreign workers seeking to sue American asbestos
companies in United States courts could overcome forum non conveniens
ganized, ordered, planned and conducted clinical studies' of thalidomide [in Ohio];
(3) planned its 'New Drug Application'... [in Ohio]; (4) prepared advertising [in Ohio]
for thalidomide; (5) claimed to have performed clinical studies [in Ohio] regarding the
drug's safety; (6) fraudulently composed a medical journal [in Ohio]...; (8) learned in
Ohio of the deformities thalidomide caused; (9) decided [in Ohio] not to issue adequate
warnings regarding use of the drug; and (10) decided [in Ohio] to withdraw the drug and
organized a plan for its withdrawal from the market.
538 F. Supp. at 274 n.17.
148. Id. at 275.
149. 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ohio 1982). In terms of private interest, the court found, on
much the same facts as existed in Lake, that more critical evidence was found in Britain than
in Ohio, and thus that convenience favored a British forum. Id. at 1134. Public interests cut
the same way. The court also decided that New York choice of law rules demanded that
British law be used to determine liability. Id. at 1135. Moreover, the court found that Ohio
had minimal interest in the safety of products that are manufactured overseas, even when the
manufacturer was a wholly-owned subsidiary of an Ohio-based corporation and the safety
testing and development of the drug was completed in the United States. Id. at 1135. On
policy grounds as well, the court thought it best to make the United Kingdom responsible for
setting its own standards of safety for drugs sold within its borders. Id. at 1136.
150. The plaintiffs did not raise a statute of limitations bar as proof that the United King-
dom forum was inadequate. Id. at 1134. The court appeared to acknowledge that this differ-
ence was critical: "In two of the cases considered by Judge Battisti the Canadian plaintiff had
the equivalent of no remedy at all under the law of Quebec because its rule of prescription had
extinguished their right of action." Id. at 1136.
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obstacles in practice.151 They are designed to reflect how foreign plain-
tiffs could bring suit in United States courts against the American
companies.
It should be noted at the outset of this analysis that in each of the case
studies the American corporation that is the potential defendant in these
suits is related to the foreign factory in a dual capacity. First, both
American corporations are the parent corporations of the Mexican and
Indian subsidiaries. Second, each American corporation supplies its for-
eign subsidiary with raw asbestos fiber for use in the plant's finished
product.1 52 Therefore, by characterizing the suit as one in products lia-
bility, the foreign plaintiff will be able to sue the American corporation
directly,1 53 avoiding the need to persuade the court to "pierce the corpo-
rate veil" to reach the parent.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must convince the court to pierce the corporate
veilH1 54 in order to assert liability against the parent. However, courts
generally view a parent and subsidiary as two separate entities and are
reluctant to pierce the corporate veil except in those cases where it is
deemed necessary in order to prevent fraud, 155 or where the parent so
dominates the subsidiary that the subsidiary may be viewed as a mere
instrumentality of the parent.1 56
Even if the foreign plaintiffs convince the courts to pierce the corpo-
rate veil, they may stand to gain little. In fact it is often the case that
when a worker sues his employer, which is a subsidiary of a parent cor-
poration, the parent corporation, and not the plaintiff, will ask the court
151. These case studies are used only to illustrate various points about the possibility of
foreign plaintiffs' products liability suits in the United States. They will be discussed through-
out this Article's analysis of the Gilbert factors, but this is not meant to imply that they are
necessarily typical situations. Rather, their importance lies in their illustrative value.
152. In each case, the American corporation supplies its foreign subsidiary through a Ca-
nadian affiliate. See infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 72-91 and accompany-
ing text.
154. This Article does not address in depth the question of whether a parent corporation
may be held liable for the torts of its subsidiary. The recent Supreme Court case of Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), in which a foreign plaintiff was permit-
ted to sue a foreign corporation in United States courts, at first glance appears to obviate any
problems that a parent-subsidiary distinction may pose. A careful reading of the case reveals,
however, that this broadened jurisdictional boundary applies only in the specific instance
where a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign sovereign under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976. Id. at 4569. In the case studies, the question is not whether a foreign plaintiff can sue
his home government, but rather whether he can reach the parent United States corporation.
155. See, eg., FMC Finance Corp. v. Murptree, 632 F.2d 413, 423 (5th Cir. 1980).
156. See, eg., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
1098, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1973), modified per curiam, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
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to pierce the corporate veil. 157 The theory is that if the parent and sub-
sidiary are viewed as a single entity, the parent will be considered the
worker's employer and entitled to workers' compensation immunity.
The plaintiff accordingly would be restricted to recovery under workers'
compensation statutes.
A number of courts, however, have refused to allow a parent to pierce
its own corporate veil in order to avoid tort liability. 158 Thus, a plaintiff
may bring an action directly against the parent. In order to succeed,
however, the plaintiff must assert that the parent performed independent
acts of negligence. 159 This would depend largely upon the degree of con-
trol the parent exercises over the premises where the worker was
injured. 16
Of course, the necessity of proving an independent tort is obviated by a
products liability theory of recovery.161 It is assumed, for the purposes
of this analysis, that the plaintiffs will include products liability as an
alternative cause of action.
1. Details of the Case Studies: Health Conditions in Asbestos Plants
The first case162 involves two asbestos textile plants located just across
157. See Peterson v. Trailways, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 827 (D. Colo. 1983) and cases cited
therein.
158. See, eg., Love v. Flour Mills of America, 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981); Boggs v.
Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979); Peterson v. Trailways, Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 827 (D. Colo. 1983).
159. See Love, 647 F.2d 1058 (plaintiffs' negligence action properly dismissed where plain-
tiffs failed to allege independent acts of negligence against the parents); Boggs, 590 F.2d 655
(district court's order to dismiss reversed where plaintiffs had asserted independent acts of
negligence on the part of the parent).
The case studies illustrate how such an analysis might affect foreign workers bringing suit
against an American parent of a foreign subsidiary. See infra notes 163-93 and accompanying
text. The Mexican asbestos plants are wholly-owned by Amatex, an American Corporation.
See infra note 163 and accompanying text. Should a court disregard the corporate entity,
Amatex would be considered the worker's employer, and the worker would be restricted to the
limited recovery available under the Mexican Worker's Compensation Law. See infra note
178. A similar result would be reached in the Indian case study. This is unlikely because
several courts have exhibited a disinclination to do so. See Peterson, 555 F. Supp. at 832, and
cases cited therein. Indeed, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has repeat-
edly refused to do so regarding asbestos litigation against Johns-Manville. In re Johns-
Manville AsbEstos Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ill. 1981); McDaniel v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
160. See Boggs, 590 F.2d 655; Peterson, 555 F. Supp. 827. It is not clear from the facts
available the degree of control Amatex and Johns-Manville exercised at the respective foreign
plants, so it is difficult to predict whether a foreign plaintiff could surmount this obstacle. It is
certain, however, that the parent corporations were aware of the hazardous conditions at these
plants. See infra notes 166 and 172 and accompanying text. Failure to take affirmative action
under the circumstances might constitute an independent tort on the parent's part.
161. See supra note 71.
162. The factual information for this case study is the result of research published by
Barry Castleman in the International Journal of Health Services. See Export of Hazardous
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the Mexican-United States border in Agua Prieta and Ciudad Juarez.
The plants are wholly-owned by the Amatex Corporation of Norristown,
Pennsylvania. 163 In 1972, Amatex closed a five-year-old asbestos yarn
plant located in Pennsylvania, and began importing large amounts of
processed fiber from the new Mexican plants.164 The asbestos fiber used
at these Mexican mills is imported from Canada by the firm; the Mexican
operation is, in effect, a processing stopover for the American asbestos
textile market.1 65
In 1977, dangerous work conditions within the Agua Prieta plant were
revealed.1 66 Soon after, some "cosmetic" improvements were made, but
neither respiratory protection nor fiber level monitoring has been
provided. 167
The second case is the Shree Digvijay Cement Company of India,
whose plant annually manufactures 68,000 tons of asbestos-cement water
pipe and sheeting material for markets in India, Southeast Asia, and Af-
rica. 68 The Johns-Manville Corporation, a Colorado-based multina-
tional corporation, was paid $250,000 in royalties for the design
Factories, supra note 18. Castleman was forced to base his findings on investigations by local
newspapers. Id. at 576-77. This dearth of information illustrates the problems involved in
assessing the risk of exported hazardous industries--one must rely on one's own surreptitious
investigation or on those of investigative reporters.
163. The location of the Amatex plant just over the United States border is the result of
Mexican foreign investment policy which, despite the country's socialist rhetoric regarding
foreign participation in the economy, has encouraged a large number of American corpora-
tions to establish operations in special export processing zones. These zones entail minimal
restriction from the Mexican government and offer greater freedom from restrictions on own-
ership and labor practices. See Grunwald, Restructuring Industry Offshore: The U.S.-Mexico
Connection, BROOKINGs REv., Spring 1983 at 24-25.
In contrast, under the 1973 Foreign Investment Law, "Mexicanization" of foreign invest-
ment outside the border area is required. This requires most foreign investors to place at least
51% of invested equity in the hands of Mexican nationals; in addition, 90% of the workers and
managers in foreign operations must be Mexicans. See AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF MEXICO, BUSINESS MEXICO 11-24 (1981).
164. Export of Hazardous Factories, supra note 18, at 576. The two million pounds im-
ported in 1975 were 25% of the entire United States asbestos textile volume.
165. Id. This would appear to be the most brazen type of export of hazardous industries:
a dangerous plant is placed just across the border from an industrialized country, with the
processes and dangerous raw materials imported.
166. A newspaper account revealed that:
Asbestos waste clings to the fence that encloses the brick plant and is strewn across the
dirt road beyond the plant where children walk to school. Inside, machinery that weaves
yam into industrial fabric is caked with asbestos waste and the floor covered with debris.
Workers in part of the factory do not wear respirators which could reduce their exposure
to asbestos dust.
Id. at 576.
167. Id. at 577. Castleman discussed several other cases of American multinationals ex-
porting hazardous waste. However, he did not include any concrete industrial hygiene data or
health reports. The authors currently are in the process of collecting such data.
168. As with the Mexican study, a series of investigations by Barry Castleman provide the
details for this case study. See Castleman, Double Standards." Asbestos in India, NEw ScI.N-
IS, Feb. 26, 1981, at 522, 523 [hereinafter cited as Double Standards]. The story has been
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technology of the plant and, in turn, paid $500,000 for a ten percent
interest in the project. 169 Johns-Manville continues to provide asbestos
fiber for the plant from Manville affiliates in Canada. 170 Few of the
safety precautions that must be observed in the United States are em-
ployed at the plant. 171 Although Manville's management has been noti-
fied of these conditions, no action has been taken.172
2. Lack of Home Remedy in the Workers' Home States
If conditions in the Mexican and Indian plants are as bad as the re-
ports indicate, some workers eventually will contract asbestosis,
mesothelioma, and/or lung cancer. Without sufficient recourse under
their nations' laws, employees of the Indian or Mexican plants might
choose to sue the asbestos suppliers in the United States court under
American strict products liability law. 173 Before being allowed to litigate
the products liability claim, the plaintiff will have to demonstrate the
lack of a remedy under her country's law. 174 The case studies illustrate
this point.
expanded by Bob Wyrick, a newspaper reporter. See Wyrick, Asbestos Plant Threatens a Vil-
lage in India, Long Island Newsday, Dec. 16, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
169. Wyrick, supra note 168, at 7, col. 1. Indian policy toward foreign corporations and
foreign investment generally has been strongly nationalistic regarding foreign ownership and
employment of nationals. See N.S. SIDDHARTHAN, CONGLOMERATES AND MULTINATION-
ALS IN INDIA: A STUDY OF INVESTMENT AND PROFIT 93 (1981). However, some loosening
of foreign investment policies recently has been seen, and India now has decided to allow
foreign investment in such areas as petroleum exploration and high technology equipment.
See Dreiberg, Indian Mission Seeks to Change Investment Image in the US, Journal of Com-
merce, May 6, 1982, at 12a; Morehouse, Letting the Genie out of the Bottle: The Micro-elec-
tronics Revolution and the Global Political Economy in the 1980's, reprinted in TECHNOLOGY
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 61, at 239. In general, however, foreign companies
are allowed only minority ownership, and reinvestment of profits or remittances abroad are
closely controlled, as are goods imported for foreign industries. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
DInCTORATE GENERAL OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT, HANDBOOK OF FOREIGN COLLAn-
ORATION (1980).
170. Wyrick, supra note 168, at 7, col. 2.
171. For example, there are no 'wet processes' to reduce the level of airborne asbestos. Id.
at 22, col. 1. Industrial filter masks, which provide protection against asbestos exposure, are
issued to permanent workers only; temporary workers do not receive any masks. Id. Workers
wear their own clothes into the workplace and no laundry facilities are provided. Id. All of
these practices are prohibited in the United States by the OSHA permanent standard on asbes-
tos. See 29 C.F.R. 1990.151, Table 2 (1983).
172. In 1980, Castleman documented conditions around the plant and presented his find-
ings to Paul Kotin, Johns-Manville's Senior Vice President for Health and Safety. Double
Standards, supra note 168. Although Kotin found the report "terribly disturbing," no im-
provements have been made, to the knowledge of the authors. Wyrick, supra note 168 at 23.
173. This strategy parallels that of domestic workers who have opted to sue the suppliers
of the now largely defunct United States manufacturing plants.
174. A motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds most likely will be denied
when an alternative is so unsatisfactory as to be nonexistent. See supra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text. It appears that at a minimum, a foreign plaintiff must present the court
with evidence that no adequate remedy exists in her home forum. See supra notes 148-72 and
accompanying text. While this factor may not be dispositive of a motion to dismiss on forum
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The protection of workers' health has a relatively long history in Mex-
ico, 175 but there are no specific health regulations to protect workers
from asbestos. 176 Moreover, Mexican law prohibits any recovery for a
worker beyond the two or three years of minimal wages provided under
workers' compensation. 177 A products liability tort action is simply not
available. 178
An argument can be made that the Mexican government has legislated
against double recovery through workers' compensation and products li-
non conveniens grounds, see-Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254-55, its weight should
not be underestimated. See supra notes 148-78 and accompanying text.
It should be further noted that, in the absence of pre-trial discovery procedures, one cannot
set forth all the facts necessary for a judicial resolution of a forum non conveniens motion.
The case studies cited herein thus provide merely a broad framework for exploring the feasibil-
ity of foreign plaintiffs' products liability suits.
175. Following the Mexican Revolution, the Constitution of 1917 included a paragraph
that stated: "Employers shall be liable for industrial accidents and occupational diseases aris-
ing from or in the execution of the trade or work, therefore, employers shall pay the proper
indemnity, according to whether death or merely temporary or permanent disability has en-
sued, according to the provisions of the law." M. CLAR, ORGANIZED LABOUR IN MEXICO
230 (1937).
Despite employers' attempts to repeal this part of the Constitution, the new Federal Labor
Law, enacted in 1931, advocated worker health protection. Id. at 231. Labor law has contin-
ued to carry constitutional force in Mexico. J. HERGET & J. CAMIL, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 30 (1978) (discussing Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution,
which dealt with workers' compensation).
176. Articles 472-515 of the Federal Labor Law deal with occupational disease and indus-
trial hazards. MEXICAN LABOR LAW (CCH Span.-Eng. ed. 1978). However, there is no men-
tion of acceptable levels of asbestos.
177. Articles 484-87 of the Federal Labor Law concern the calculation of compensation to
which a worker is entitled, the general rule being minimum wage to twice the average wage of
the region. Articles 482-96 deal with various limitations on the normal stipend, and articles
500-02 limit compensation to 735 days of wages when a worker dies. Finally, article 513
exhaustively lists the variety of occupational diseases for which compensation is granted; as-
bestosis and mesothelioma caused by asbestos are included, but bronchogenic lung cancer is
not.
178. Civil law in Mexico is based on the 3,060 articles of the Mexican Code, a descendant
of the classic Code Napoleon of 1804. J. HERGET & J. CAMIL, supra note 175, at 33-35.
Article 1910 of the Civil Code provides that: "He who acting illegally or against good customs
causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it, unless he proves the damage occurred in
consequence of the fault or inexplicable negligence of the victim." Id. at 43. There is no
recovery for pain and suffering; the emphasis is on repair of damages. Money damages are
limited to the amount available under the Federal Labor Law's workers' compensation sched-
ule. Indeed, not only is tort recovery tied to workers' compensation, but Articles 23-29 of the
Social Security Law also base social security benefits on workers' compensation. See O.A.S.
Document, supra note 25, at 139.
This means not only that "the typical recovery in a personal injury or death action is much
less than one would expect to find in Anglo-American jurisdictions," but also that the injured
worker has no additional products liability tort remedy under Mexican law: a worker's death
is worth no more than two years of wages to his family, no matter what legal theory is utilized.
Id. at 143.
Mexican law does provide for strict liability for damages caused by dangerous items. J.
HERGET & J. CAMIL, supra note 175 at 45. However, this is of little importance to the injured
workers as the workers' compensation provisions place a ceiling on the maximum recovery,
and are governed, as in the United States, by strict liability principles. Id. at 31.
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ability tort claims. This argument fails for two reasons. First, a sup-
plier's liability could be reduced by the amount of the workers'
compensation award. 179 Second, courts generally should refrain from
policy considerations when making an initial determination of the exist-
ence of alternative forums.' 80 Consequently, a district court would prob-
ably conclude that there was no alternative forum for the Mexican
workers' claims.'18
Since 1923, Indian workers have been entitled to compensation for ill-
ness or injury arising out of their work. 8 2 Although a small compensa-
tion is provided for asbestosis, there are no provisions for asbestos-related
lung cancer or mesothelioma.'8 3 Workers can seek a common law rem-
edy for their injuries, but if such a suit is filed, a worker cannot receive
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.184 Thus, a
worker cannot institute a products liability tort action in India if he al-
ready has received workers' compensation of any sort.18 5
179. See generally M. FRANKLIN, supra note 71, at 783-86. E.G. Santisteven v. Dow
Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1974).
180. For example, in In Re Aircrash Disaster Near Bombay, 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D.
Wash. 1982), the court ruled that there was no alternative forum and denied a forum non
conveniens motion. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. The lack of an alternative
forum resulted from a statute of limitations time bar. A policy argument could have been
made at this point that India did not want to hamper commerce and so set down a strict one-
year statute of limitations. This argument should not succeed; the focus rightfully is on the
alternative forum for the particular claim brought in the United States, not on the policies
underlying the differences in law.
181. Even assuming the statutory provisions are not enough to foreclose plaintiffs' claims,
there are no contingency fees allowed by Mexican law, so it is doubtful that a Mexican plaintiff
could get or afford adequate representation in court. This factor often is weighed in a United
States court's forum non conveniens determination. See supra note 108.
182. See B. BHAR, A HANDBOOK OF LABOUR LAWS 166 (1969). The employer is strictly
liable. Id. at 167. The Workmen's Compensation Act defines partial and total disablement,
establishes compensation schedules, and defines employer liability. See, G. SINHA & P. SINHA,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LABOUR LEGISLATION 562-81 (1977). The amount of compen-
sation for permanent total disablement varies from $1250 to $5000 depending on the worker's
wage. Id. at 572. In reality, compensation often is much less than this. Vilanilam recounts
the crushing death of a 26-year-old laborer caused by an unguarded machine in a tire plant; his
family eventually received $250 in compensation. Vilanilam, supra note 12, at 234.
183. Occupational disease specifically is provided for in Schedule III of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. See B. BHAR, supra note 182, at 173.
Occupational health and safety conditions are addressed in the Indian Factories Act of
1948, which was patterned after the British Factories Act of 1937. See G. SINHA & P. SINHA,
supra note 182, at 376. The effectiveness of these provisions is undermined by a lack of state
enforcement action. Vilanilam notes:
Even today, despite the existence of laws and regulations, there is no effective monitoring
machinery to detect flaws in the implementation of various acts. Implementation of la-
bour laws cannot succeed because of the availability of cheap labor. Employers can flaunt
laws with impunity when workmen acquiesce to any indignity or ill treatment for the sake
of sheer survival.
Vilanilam, supra note 12.
184. See B. BHAR, supra note 182, at 173.
185. Id. It is notable that strict liability tort law, while recognized in India, has not devel-
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Consequently, assuming that a worker at the cement plant has re-
ceived a small compensation for asbestosis and has now contracted
mesothelioma, he or she would have no alternative forum due to Indian
law prohibiting a tort claim once workers' compensation is granted.18 6
Thus, it is unnecessary for a reviewing district court to consider whether
the miniscule compensation available to an Indian worker is adequate,
whether an Indian worker would be able to get legal representation in the
absence of contingency fees, or whether the statute of limitations for per-
sonal injury action had tolled.187 The Indian alternative forum is quite
nonexistent.
3. Analysis of Other Reyno/Gilbert Factors
Although the lack of home remedy is a strong argument against forum
non conveniens dismissal, a court considering suits by our foreign plain-
tiffs may weigh other factors in the Reyno/Gilbert formula.188 Like the
courts in the Richardson-Merrell litigation cases, 189 the court may ana-
lyze other Reyno/Gilbert conditions in order to determine whether an
American forum is available.
The actual forum in which the plaintiff chooses to litigate will to a
large extent determine the outcome of the court's analysis of the Reynol
Gilbert factors.190 This is because the location of the trial will determine
those practical considerations "that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious, and inexpensive,"1 91 and which these factors are designed to bal-
ance. For simplicity of discussion, this Article will assume that the
Mexican plaintiff would sue Amatex in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, where the Amatex headquarters is located,192 and the Indian
plaintiff would bring suit in federal district court in Colorado, the state in
oped appreciably under the common law. See R.S. S NHA, THE LAW OF ToRTs 422-58
(1965).
186. Indeed, it is difficult to see how any products liability forum exists in India unless a
worker sues initially in an Indian court under a Borel rubric, a foolhardy move given the
rudimentary development of strict liability in India. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying
text. This would be a poor strategy even if strict liability were well developed. Few workers in
the United States, for instance, would pass up the often inadequate but relatively automatic
workers' compensation for a chance at a products liability recovery.
187. The court in the Bombay Air Crash case addressed all these considerations. See
supra note 134 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 174.
189. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
190. These other factors are discussed in notes 100-32 supra and accompanying text.
191. Gilbert v. Gulf Oil, Inc., 330 U.S. at 508.
192. This would effectively moot the Erie question with regard to forum non conveniens.
Throughout the Reyno litigation, all courts assumed that Federal and Pennsylvania law of
forum non conveniens were identical. See, eg. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d at 158
n.20.
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which Johns-Manville is headquartered. 193
a. Private Interests
The two principal concerns of the private interest inquiry 194 are the
relative availability of sources of proof and the relative ease of joining
necessary parties to the litigation. 195 In both the Mexican and Indian
cases, the balance appears to be tipped in favor of denying the forum non
conveniens motions on grounds of the relative availability of sources of
proof.
For example, in the Mexican litigation, most of the evidence concern-
ing employment records, export of asbestos raw material, and fiber pro-
duction would be located in Pennsylvania. 196 Expert witnesses qualified
to testify on the ill-health effects of asbestos also would be readily avail-
able on the East Coast of the United States. 197 Defendants could argue,
of course, that a Mexican forum, where medical records, plant condi-
tions, and other testimony might be found would be more appropriate. 198
The court's final determination would depend on the specific facts of
each litigant's case. 199 A Pennsylvania forum certainly would not be
ruled out simply on the basis of the availability of witnesses and evidence.
In the Indian plaintiff's suit, private factors do not appear to favor
defendants. Experts on the plant design as well as medical experts may
be found in the United States, and not in India.20° As in the Mexican
193. The court's initial determination would be whether to apply federal or state forum
non conveniens law, assuming Johns-Manville would seek dismissal on these grounds. See
supra note 192. Colorado law of forum non conveniens uses the same private and public inter-
est analysis as federal courts. See Lohn v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 37 Colo. App. 59, 543
P.2d 1315 (1975), affid, 192 Colo. 200, 557 P.2d 373 (1976). If anything, the Colorado courts
are more unlikely to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds than are federal courts. Colo-
rado courts will not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds "unless the balance [of the
Renyo/Gilbert factors] is strongly in favor of the defendant. . . " Allison Drilling Co. v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 31 Colo. App. 355, 356; 503 P.2d 967, 968 (1972), citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). See also McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Lolm, 192 Colo. 200,
557 P.2d 373 (1976).
194. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
195. See, eg., Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, 538 F. Supp. 262, 270-71 (N.D. Ohio 1982);
Whyham v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 96 F.R.D. 557 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Apolinario v. Arco Corp.,
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,547 (D. Conn. 1982).
196. The defendant asbestos supplier would be a United States corporation with Canadian
operations. The forum in which the corporate headquarters is located might provide a better
forum. There, one would find export records concerning asbestos shipped to Agua Prieta and
Ciudad Juarez.
197. A collateral estoppel ruling would obviate the need to litigate the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" issue. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
198. This evidence could be made available by means of affidavits. See Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 259 n.27.
199. See id. at 249 citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
200. Johns-Manville designed the Shree Digvijay plant. See supra notes 168-72 and ac-
companying text.
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situation, medical testimony about the worker's illness could be made
available by affadavit, and collateral estoppel would simplify the eviden-
tiary issues.201
The joinder issue also would likely not prove fatal to the foreign plain-
tiff's suit.202 Asbestos producers usually join other producers as co-de-
fendants. 20 3 This requires that defendants litigate in jurisdictions
removed from what might be their most convenient forum. Thus a Mex-
ican plaintiff's bringing suit in Pennsylvania would be no more onerous
than the usual asbestos product liability case. Moreover, the sole party
in Mexico whom the asbestos suppliers may wish to join is Amatex,
which likely would be immune from further liability.2 °4
Johns-Manville's role as sole supplier of asbestos as well as part-owner
of the Indian plant would similarly appear to obviate most joinder
problems.20 5 In summary, it is difficult to see how a Pennsylvania or
Colorado venue would vex or harass, respectively, Amatex or Johns-
Manville. 206
b. Public Interests
In analyzing the public interest factors,207 one must first address
choice of law rules. A court will often find great inconvenience when
choice of law rules demand that foreign law be applied by the court.208 It
does not appear that this situation would be encountered if the Mexican
plaintiff sues in Pennsylvania court.
In the Reyno litigation, the circuit court carefully analyzed Penn-
sylvania law and concluded that Pennsylvania applied a governmental
interest analysis.209 Therefore the court must inquire whether "the be-
201. See supra notes 87-91 & 197 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., role of multiple defendants. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1982) (consideration given to the role of multiple defendants).
203. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Johns-Manville Corp., 96 F.R.D. 367 (1982); Curry v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 93 F.RLD. 623 (1982).
204. If the Mexican plaintiff first had sought relief under workers' compensation, the as-
bestos suppliers would be unable to join the employer of the plaintiff, due to the limit on
liability granted to employers by the workers' compensation law. See supra notes 177-78 and
accompanying text.
205. It is difficult to see whom Johns-Manville would join, unless the Indian co-owner of
the plant, plaintiff's immediate employer, were brought in. However, this kind ofjoinder nor-
mally is prohibited by workers' compensation laws. India is no exception. See supra notes
158-60 & 183-85 and accompanying text.
206. The Gilbert Court stated "that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient
forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not
necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy." 330 U.S. at 508.
207. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
208. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 734-37 (M.D. Pa. 1979); see also
supra note 114.
209. 630 F.2d at 180. This finding was not overruled specifically by the Supreme Court.
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havior giving rise to the contact furthers or abrogates a state policy. '210
In the Mexican case, it can be argued that Mexico has a governmental
interest in protecting its citizens' health, and that Mexico has significant
contacts with the Amatex plants. Nevertheless, it is Amatex, a resident
of Pennsylvania, which has exported the hazardous workplace, maintain-
ing complete control over the factory while supplying it with the asbes-
tos. Under our federal government, the state must accept responsibility
for the regulation of industry; arguably, the citizens of Pennsylvania are
thus responsible for the iff-health effects caused by asbestos that is ex-
ported from that state. This analysis suggests that the proper party upon
whom costs should be imposed is the exporter of the hazardous industry,
Amatex.211 Because Pennsylvania has the greatest governmental interest
in regulating Amatex, Pennsylvania law should apply, thus avoiding the
court's reluctance to apply unfamiliar law.
It is not so clear what law a Colorado court would apply in the Indian
case. In the case of First National Bank v. Rostek,212 the Colorado
Supreme Court, following the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145,
rejected the lex loci delecti doctrine "in favor of a more flexible and ra-
tional choice of law approach in multi-state tort cases. '213 Section 145
recommends that "the law of the state which. . . has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. . ." be applied.214
While it might seem that India would have the most significant contact
with an Indian plaintiff's products liability suit, and thus Indian law
should apply, it is a relevant Colorado policy to regulate the corporation
headquartered there.215 An argument accordingly can be made for the
application of Colorado law in this case, simplifying matters for the dis-
trict court.
The other principal public factor, the increased load on court dockets,
would go against both a Mexican plaintiff suing in Pennsylvania and an
Indian plaintiff suing in Colorado. The load would, of course, be mini-
mized if collateral estoppel were granted. 216 Even if collateral estoppel
were not granted, it seems unlikely that a court would approve a forum
210. Id.
211. As Judge Battisti noted in the Lake case:
The purpose of much of the law of torts and product liability is to deter wrongful activity,
as well as to compensate the victims thereof and to impose on the proper party the cost of
insuring against risks of a certain activity.
538 F. Supp. at 274; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
212. 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973).
213. Id. at 443-44, 514 P.2d at 317.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145 (1971).
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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non conveniens motion solely because of a burdened docket. 217 This is
especially true when the alternative forums, Mexico and India, do not
provide the plaintiffs with an adequate remedy.218
Balancing all of the factors, it appears a Mexican plaintiff has a good
chance of gaining access to a Pennsylvania forum applying Pennsylvania
law to his product liability claim against Amatex. Similarly, an Indian
plaintiff would probably defeat a forum non conveniens motion and be
able to sue Johns-Manville under a strict products liability rubric in Col-
orado district court that would probably apply Colorado law. Neither
public nor private interests clearly compel dismissal. The nonexistence
of an adequate home remedy thus would appear dispositive. As the court
stated in Lake, "if recourse. . . to law in the other forum is so unsatis-
factory as to provide no remedy at all, dismissal of [this case] would not
be in the interests of justice." 219
Conclusion
As our case situations demonstrate, foreign plaintiffs can conceivably
overcome forum non conveniens problems and gain access to U.S. courts.
When they do, they will be able to take advantage of favorable products
liability laws, and collateral estoppel will enable them to bypass time-
consuming evidentiary matters and speed litigation of their claims.
This will result in asbestos suppliers being as liable for asbestos
processing done outside the United States as for that done within the
U.S. Consequently, U.S. asbestos suppliers will be encouraged to apply
the same incentives to Third World asbestos plants that suppliers exert
directly or indirectly on asbestos processors in the U.S., resulting in the
adoption of safer occupational practices in hazardous industries.
Thus, the prospect of suits by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts can pro-
vide an impetus for controlling the export of hazardous industries. Ef-
forts by international bodies or home country nations to raise awareness
of the problem of hazardous industries or to construct internationally
effective standards are still to be highly desired, but the legal recourse of
suits by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts may offer a more immediately
effective solution.
The idea that private legal action be taken in the United States as an
attempt to control a problem that is, narrowly, the domestic concern of
host Third World nations, raises some interesting issues for international
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law and politics. Not least of these is the implication that the U.S. law
could be, de facto, widely extended to events occurring within many
other regions of the world, particularly in light of the inability of interna-
tional bodies to resolve difficult issues posed by the international spread
of hazardous technology. A successful action by a developing country
worker against an American company under U.S. law would undoubt-
edly cause a flurry of concern. One by-product may be revision of host
country legislation or MNC contracts to prevent further such suits. We
hope that another by-product will be a more careful examination of occu-
pational health and safety issues by the home governments, as well as a
higher level of concern on the part of the companies and international
organizations.
